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Thesis Advisor: Özge Kemahlıog˘lu
This paper presents an alternative explanation for the possible incentives of the in-
cumbents in authoritarian regimes to hold elections by utilizing a formal model that is
derived to simulate the strategic interaction between the incumbent and the people.
Equilibria of the models show us that, there exists feasible circumstances under which
the incumbent would prefer to allow elections to be hold with the purpose of the selec-
tion of an officer that the incumbent may later on benefit from by shifting the blame of
an external crisis, hence weaken the risk of a regime breakdown.
OTORI˙TER REJI˙MLERDE LI˙DER DAYANIKLILIG˘I:
Bas¸ka Birini Suçlayabilmenin Rolü
Aybike Mutluer
M.A., 2013
Tez Danıs¸manı: Özge Kemahlıog˘lu
Bu tez, iktidar ve halk arasındaki stratejik etkiles¸imi simule eden bir formal model
aracılıg˘ıyla otoriter rejimlerde liderlerin seçimlerin yapılmasına izin verme sebepler-
ine alternatif bir açıklama getirmektedir. Kullanılan modelin denge noktaları, liderin
ileride meydana gelebilecek dıs¸ kaynaklı bir krizde suçu üstüne atabileceg˘i bir pozisyon
yaratarak rejimin dayanıklılıg˘ını arttırma amacıyla seçimlere izin verebileceg˘i s¸artların
var oldug˘unu göstermektedir.
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1 Introduction
Authoritarian regimes are problematic. First and foremost, defining what an author-
itarian regime is in positive terms remains to be challenging even today. One of the
most frequently used definitions is that the authoritarian regimes are the ones "in
which rulers acquire power by means other than competitive elections."(Gandhi (2008))
Compared to the minimalist definition of democracy, "a regime in which those who
govern are selected through contested elections"(Przeworski et al. (2000)), it is apparent
that the autocracies are the regimes in which the leaders acquire power through any
means except what is considered to be democratic, which in effect tells us nothing on
dictatorships apart from them being non-democracies.
One reason for this ambiguity about authoritarian regimes may be found in the re-
search trends in political science. These systems have been mostly seen as transitional
phases into democracy, that would supposedly prevail eventually, for a good part of
the last five decades after Lipset paved the way for the famous paradigm, known as the
modernization theory, in 1959.(Przeworski and Limongi (1997)) Dismissed as a passage
to an eventual conclusion, the point of academic interest has been on developing ways
to hasten the transformation, and hence, naturally, understanding the factors behind
this process of modernization, instead of the actual institutions that constitute, and
perhaps help the persistence, of these regimes. Apart from a few notable exceptions
(Linz (1973) and O’Donnell (1973))1, the structure of the regime or the constitution of
these systems are deemed to possess little importance (Friedrich and Brzezinski (1961))
until the last decade.
Recently, some scholars came to acknowledge that these regimes may not be some
mere phases on the path to the democracy. In fact, as we experienced regime break-
downs in which the democracies turned into authoritarian regimes (O’Donnell et al.
(1986)), as well as countries that developed economically but not democratized (Prze-
worski et al. (2000)), the evidence pointed us that the road to democratization may not
1Linz (1973) took the spectrum of regimes as separate categories, not as a continuum, hence did not
accept the existence of a grey zone in between.
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be a linear upward trend as the modernization theory assumed. But this new under-
standing of regime types brought about new questions, such as "How do these regimes
persist?" To put it differently, which mechanisms are responsible for the survival of
authoritarian regimes for very long time periods?
Among several explanations that have been proposed throughout the last twenty
years, one of the most engrossing hypotheses focuses on the adoption of some institu-
tions by these non-democratic systems that has been judged previously as exclusively
democratic, particularly elections. Although authoritarian elections have came to be
seen as a type of window-dressing by previous studies (Friedrich and Brzezinski (1961)),
the empirical evidence shows us that the authoritarian regimes that hold elections are
more durable than those who do not (Geddes (1999)), suggesting that authoritarian
elections may be more than what has been attributed to them(Gandhi and Przeworski
(2007), Boix and Svolik (2011)). More precisely, even though the literature seem to
provide the basis for us to conclude that the authoritarian regimes survive longer when
they adopt certain institutions that are usually linked with democratic regimes2, such
as elections and legislatures, the mechanism behind this outcome is still far from being
well-understood. (Bienen and van de Walle (1991))
To the best of my knowledge, the research that has been made on these authori-
tarian institutions has focused mainly on their use as a tool to share the spoils of the
regime with the elites (Boix and Svolik (2011)), party members (Magaloni (2006)) or
larger interest groups (Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi (2008)) so that the
incumbent can secure the support of these groups or, to put in other words, eliminate
the opposition they may pose. Hence, these institutions have been assumed to serve
the role of a balancer between the incumbents and some interest groups.3 Though this
particular explanation of the employment of this institutions by authoritarian regimes
may be quite intriguing, I believe co-optation may not be the only reason why we
observe legislatures and elections in these systems, they may as well have other roles
in increasing the survivability of the authoritarian regimes. More precisely, I believe
these institutions may provide the necessary means to create a scapegoat to whom the
incumbent can shift the blame in case of a crisis. Therefore, in this paper, I will study
the possible existence of the trade off between consolidation of the incumbent’s power
and conceiving an insurance that can be utilized to decrease the probability of a regime
breakdown by creating credible positions that can be presented as the responsible party
via these institutions if need be, in authoritarian regimes.
2Boix and Svolik (2011) provides a detailed account of this phenomenon.
3A more complete survey of the explanations that has been proposed by previous research will be
presented in the next section.
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In this regard, this paper will first derive a formal model to understand the strategic
decision making process behind the implementation of such a mechanism and secondly
it will provide the case studies to shed light on the feasibility of such a mechanism.4
For this end the first section provides an overview of the previous research on authori-
tarian elections which will be surveyed with special focus on the proposed incentives
for the autocrats to hold these elections, as well as a crucial evidence from the field of
experimental economics for the hypothesis offered in this paper can base on. Then, the
existing theories on the resilience of monarchies relative to the authoritarian republics
will be presented with a special emphasis on how the hypothesis argued in this paper
covers and exceeds the explanations provided by the previous literature.
Next, a formal model will be derived in which I will show the strategic interaction
between the incumbent and the population as a whole to determine the circumstances
under which the incumbent would have an incentive to resort to such blame shifting
via holding elections. Then, we will continue with the somewhat quasi-experiment
of the Arab Spring and it’s effect on four different states, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and
Morocco, in MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region to see if such a mechanism
holds empirically. We will try to demonstrate that the conditions (or values of the
parameters that are incorporated into the model) vary between these countries which
eventually led them to end up in different equilibria that translates into the survival
capabilities of each regime.
4The important point in this second part of my thesis is that I do not attempt to provide the whole story
from the incumbent’s decision to the society’s decision. On the contrary, I simply aim to show that
empirically it’s applaudable to argue that shifting the blame can increase the chances of survival for
an authoritarian regime.
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2 Literature Review
Since this paper derives it’s explanatory power from two different sources of literature,
the literature review section will also be divided into two parts, first presenting the
previous studies on rational choice based theories that attempt to explain the incentives
behind an autocrat’s choice to hold elections and secondly, the suggested reasonings
behind the seemingly more resistant monarchies of the MENA region when compared
to the authoritarian republics of the same geography.
2.1 Formal Model
Along with several institutions, authoritarian elections came to be seen as a type of
window dressing until recently. The phenomenon has been dismissed from majority
of the research agendas in political science based on the belief that these elections do
not have neither significant causes nor consequences. But considering that holding
elections are costly both monetarily and politically for the autocrats, it is only logical
that they serve a purpose. The crucial question that needs an answer to further our
understanding on authoritarian regimes is what this purposes can be.
One of the reasons proposed for the existence of authoritarian elections revolved
around the role of those elections as a deacon, either internally or externally. The
grounds for both internal and external delusion arguments was the supposed increase
in the legitimacy of the regime by making it seem less authoritarian. Neither of these
arguments are quite convincing for legitimacy can be achieved through other means
such as ideology and economic performance. Another, but closely tied to external
legitimacy argument, explanation for autocrats to have incentives to hold elections
as a deacon is the argument of international norm, in which the elections serve as a
costly signal that the country is in fact a part of the international community and allow
these authoritarian countries to access benefits of this status, even if the elections are
-especially in some cases- evidently distorted (Hyde (2011)). Although this argument
4
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provides a more substantial explanation of the phenomenon, it only provides incentives
that autocrats might have due to external conditions.
A second set of arguments on the incentives for the authoritarian regimes to hold
elections revolves around the role these elections might play for the survival or the
persistence of these regimes internally. According to one branch of this literature, elec-
tions are way to reduce the possible pressure that has been built up against the regime.
Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argue that elections are a way to co-opt the opposition,
and by creating an institution for the opposition to have a stake at the regime, the oppo-
sition is in fact somehow domesticated. But since the type of the threat the opposition
constitutes as well as the threat’s magnitude varies from case to case, not all authoritar-
ian regimes resort such a mechanism. Another branch of the literature focuses on the
inherent non-credibility of the autocrats’ promises and its role in internal conflict. Boix
and Svolik (2011) argue that elections in authoritarian regimes serve as an observable
signal which reduces the non-credibility of the autocrats and hence ease the problem
of power sharing by creating an opportunity for the autocrat and the elites to interact.
Similarly, Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) see authoritarian elections as a way that en-
ables the autocrats to increase their legitimacy by inclusion of the opposition, since
by participating in these elections perforce the opposition to be a part of the system.
Moreover, these elections, according to Gandhi and Lust-Okar, define the acceptable
and unacceptable ways of participation which could serve as a stabilizing mechanism
for the regime, as well as providing a relatively smooth mechanism of sharing the spoils
of the regime with the elites.
A third branch examines another aspect of the possible benefits of the authoritarian
elections, namely the information revealed through elections. Magaloni (2006), Ames
(1970) and Brownlee (2007) argue that the authoritarian regimes identify their support-
ers via the information revealed by elections and they use this information to decide
whether to punish or reward different segments of the electorate. Similarly, Blaydes
(2006) and Birney (2007) contend that elections reveal useful information, though they
claim that the information is about the competency and the loyalty of the regime’s own
apparatus such as the party. Finally, another possible use of the information gathered
via elections is argued by Londregan and Vindigni (2006). They claim that the elections
provide both opposition and the autocrats the information about each sides relative
strengths, hence facilitate the grounds for bargaining by decreasing the uncertainty
caused by the lack of knowledge. Though a problematic aspect of this explanation is the
effect of electoral fraud on the credibility, and therefore the efficacy, of the results and
the information that can be inferred, one can argue that the capability to execute a fraud
that would alter the results significantly would also signal strength on the incumbent’s
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part.
Given the mentioned previous research on authoritarian elections, it is clear that
several different explanations have been offered on the issue, though the question asked
in this paper, and henceforth in my thesis, can be answered by none. To the best of my
knowledge, no research has been conducted on the possible role of elections as a mech-
anism of blame shifting. This paper, on the other hand, will argue that the existence of
elections, and the institutions related to them, may also be salutary if the incumbent
can position herself more favorably by shifting the blame to the offices that has been
created by this institutions in time of a crisis. In other words, the incumbent, in this
case, does not share her power to create the support she needs in order to consolidate
the regime today, but she trades her power to create an insurance like mechanism that
may decrease the level of responsibility on the incumbent when and if an external crisis
takes place.
Fortunately, the lack of previous literature on research question may be surmounted
by another line of research from experimental economics. Oexl and Grossman (2011),
based on the work of Bartling and Fischbacher (2011), argues that "dictators who choose
selfishly via an intermediary are punished less and earn greater profits than those who
directly choose a selfish outcome, while the intermediary is punished more." In other
words, their results show us that the remaining players will react differently given the
same outcome, when the dictator introduces an intermediary player. Moreover, they
argue that their results are robust for the cases even when the intermediary is left with
a choice between two unfair alternatives. This findings are critical for the research
question of this paper, because the results of this experimental dictator game provides
the necessary incentive for the incumbent in an authoritarian regime to introduce the
institutions that would create the intermediary. In other words, the findings of Oexl
and Grossman (2011) shows us that the incumbent in an authoritarian regime is bet-
ter off with an intermediary, as long as the required share of power to create such an
intermediary does not overcome the decrease in the punishment, since the incumbent
will be punished less for her decisions, even when she presents the intermediary with
alternatives that are both favoring her interests.
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2.2 Case Studies
"The nearly universally complacent, unresponsive and often contemptu-
ous policies and positions of the governments produced a nearly universal
response: demands for effective citizenship, personal agency and govern-
ment accountability."5
This paper is an attempt to understand what makes some of the regimes survive while
others are overthrown during the Arab Spring. There are a few attempts to explain this
diversity, though since the time elapsed from the beginning of the Arab Spring is quite
short, the hypotheses that have been put forward are not fully developed. We can divide
this literature into two categories: type independent (e.g., authoritarian learning6) and
type dependent hypotheses.
The authoritarian learning hypothesis as an example of the theories that attempt to
explain the diversity of outcome when faced with the Arab Spring protests argue that
authoritarian leaders learn how to handle protests in their countries by observing the
reactions in other countries. The fundamental novelty of this hypothesis is that it allows
for the authoritarian leaders to have an evolutionary learning process, similar to the
one that the society have in protests literature.
In regard with the hypothesis presented in this paper, I argue that the very assumption
of the incumbent knowing that her chances for survival increases when she designates
or allows for the election to held for the position of the officer somewhat depends on
this learning process. To be more explicit, the rationale behind the assumption is that
as the authoritarian leaders observe the past and present events in other countries, they
learn that if there is another body in executive organization that can be utilized to avoid
the regime breakdown. But this hypothesis on authoritarian learning by itself does not
provide us with sufficient answers. For example, if all autocrats can observe successful
methods that can be employed to avoid being overthrown, why some autocrats fail to
choose these policies and allow a regime breakdown? If timing or the learning curve
of the individual incumbents cannot be effective due to simultaneous processes in
the MENA region, then we need to identify some other parameters that may effect the
feasibility of such methods under different circumstances.
Type dependent hypotheses,on the other hand, focus on the differentiation of re-
silience between the republics and the monarchies in the MENA region. Menaldo (2012)
5Anderson (2011), p. 6
6Heydemann and Leenders (2011), p. 648
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provides the empirical evidence on the relative strength of monarchies in comparison
to the authoritarian republics in this region without supporting this evidence with a
substantial theory. The innate structures of the monarchies7 hypothesis differentiates
the types of authoritarian regimes and hence gets one step closer to defining param-
eters mentioned in the paragraph above, though it fails to put a finger on the exact
mechanism that allows for these differentiated results under different authoritarian
regime types. Anderson (2011), on the other hand, goes a little further and argue that
this differentiation may be caused by one or multiple of a handful of reasonings. One
of these paths are closely related to the argument of this paper. Anderson argues that
"Monarchy may be a useful device by which rulers can distance themselves from the
failings of their policies, salvaging the regime by dismissing the government." or in other
words,
"Authoritarian regimes have different legitimacy formulae, and rulers who
can distance themselves from their governments - as is often the case of
kings - may have opportunities to respond to popular demands for change
that permit regime survival."8
Even though Anderson identifies the monarchies advantage as their ability to distance
themselves from their government, she does not single out why this ability increases
their resilience. Therefore, utilizing the formal model that will be presented in the
next section, this paper will attempt to derive a clear reasoning how monarchies are
better suited to use blame-shifting due to their mentioned ability, hence take Anderson’s
argument to the next level.
Moreover, the hypothesis presented in this paper should not be viewed only as an
attempt to explain the differences between monarchs and authoritarian republics.This
is a more general theory then Ômonarchs are more resilient than other autocratsÕ, it
can be applied to any part of the world for any time period for the modern states.
7Keyman (2011)
8Anderson (2011), p. 8
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3 Formal Model
To be able to speculate that some authoritarian leaders implement policies to be utilized
in times of crisis knowingly and willingly, we need to show that the incumbents have
incentives to choose to share their power to create such a mechanism, knowing that
the society will also behave accordingly. Moreover, we need to define the regions for
parameters in which the incumbents will be better off by utilizing this mechanism, in
other words, conditions for such a strategy to be an equilibrium.
3.1 Formal Analysis
This paper will employ a formal model in order to examine the circumstances required
for an incumbent of an authoritarian regime to have an incentive to hold elections with
the intention of using the institutions created as a result of them as a blame shifting
mechanism if need be later on.
Before moving on to the presentation of specifications and the equilibria that are
driven from the model, it might be beneficial to define the players, whose definitions
will be constant through out the remaining of the paper. The model has two players.
The first player is the incumbent (I), the head of the state, or in other words the autocrat
in power, who will be assumed to have a single interest to protect. In other words, even
though this specification does not limit the incumbent to one-man systems, preliminary
analysis revealed no additional benefit in including the concerns over other interests,
such as the wellbeing of the ruling party or the future position of the military in the
system. Therefore as a simplification of the complications that are born out of the
classification issues regarding authoritarian regimes, the model will assume that the
incumbent, whomever that player represents in a given case, has a stake in the survival
of the regime as it is and does not have any additional concerns that conflict with this
incentive.
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The second player is the society (S). The word society is chosen on purpose because
restricting the second player to a certain group such as elites does not provide a better
understanding of the mechanism the model aims to analyze. On the contrary, the nature
of the model requires the second player to remain as general as possible, to keep the
second player’s interests separate from the interests of those who might gain extra utility
by filling the offices that might be created by the institutions mentioned.
Figure 3.1: Sequence of Events
The model is a two stage extensive form game with perfect and complete information
between the incumbent (I) and the society (S). The sequence of events is as follows: in
t0, the incumbent, given that the country does not hold elections at that moment, has
three choices, she can decide whether to create the necessary institutions and assign
someone to the post, she can allow elections and let the winner to take the post created
or she can just keep the status quo as it is. In t1, nature determines whether a crisis
takes place or not with probability p. If the crisis does not actualize the status quo is
preserved, whereas if it takes place then in t2, the society is faced with three alternatives.
They can revolt against the office, given that it has been created by the incumbent in t0,
and take down whomever took the post with a probability that depends on the nature
of the institution that created the office, they can revolt against the regime, therefore
the incumbent, with a probability again depends on the action taken by the incumbent
in period t0 or they can decide to keep the status quo as it is.
Based on this specification and the sequence of the game there are eight different
outcomes of the model. The utility outcomes for each player is as shown in Figure 3.2
whereβ1,2,3 is the value the incumbent gets when the status quo is preserved under each
alternative respectively, whereas the α1,2,3 is the utility the society gets if and when the
alternative they chose succeeds9, c1,2,3 are the costs of each alternative for the society
and correspond toα1,2,3.10, andσ2,3 are the utilities the incumbent receives if the society
9For simplicity, α1 = 0, meaning that when society choose to keep the status quo as it is they receive
no utility in return. Moreover, since this alternative implies no active participation on behalf of the
society it succeeds automatically.
10Similarly, c1 = 0, hence the model assumes that keeping status quo do not have a cost for the society.
It is important to notice that these utilities are not loss functions for the outcome the players face
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revolts agains the officer and succeeds for saving the regime from being overthrown, for
designated and elected officers respectively.
Finally, λ1,2,3 are the probabilities for the action taken by the society not to succeed.
λ, therefore, represents the the bearing of the action taken by the incumbent on the
possibility of a regime (or officer) removal. Theoretically it consists of two parts: the
effect of the incumbent’s decision on the blame shifting opportunity in case of an
external crisis and the effect on incumbent’s consolidation of power, i1,2,3 and k1,2,3
respectively. These two parts of the function are combined under λ is because for
each alternative available to the incumbent, she necessarily chooses a pair of i j and k j ,
therefore only the combined effect of i and k are relevant to the decision making process
of the incumbent. This specification of the incumbent’s utility outcomes does not reduct
the functionality of the effect of the choice she makes, on the contrary, the formulation
of the research question based on the work of Oexl and Grossman (2011) focus on the
comparison of the magnitude of both i and k and predicts that the incumbent’s decision
to be based on this combined effect. In other words, the incumbent is not expected to
decide based on only the expected advantage of creating a blame shifting mechanism,
she would also consider the cost of this mechanism in terms of the loss of consolidation
of her power and the regime and decide accordingly.
All parameters used in the model are nonnegative and though there are no defined in-
tervals for each, based on the theoretical background of the game, model is constructed
on the following assumptions:
β1 > β2 > β3 (3.1)
α1 = 0 > α2 > α3 (3.2)
c1 = 0 > c2 > c3 (3.3)
The reason behind (3.1) is relatively straightforward. The incumbent, given that she
is the autocrat, assumed to have an incentive to preserve the power she has. To create
an office that can be blamed in case of a crisis requires her to transfer a portion of the
authority she has to this newly found institution even if it is mostly a window dressing
in terms of responsibility. Therefore, she gets the highest utility when she keeps the
regime as it is. Secondly, the model assumes that designating an officer to this post
would mean less of a power loss for the incumbent than allowing for elections to be
hold. Hence the utility of creating an institution in which the incumbent assign the
officer provides a higher utility for the incumbent than allowing the officer to be elected
given the strategies each follow, instead c only denotes the cost of the action taken by the society and
therefore does not represent the possible discontent for the existing institutions and the effect of the
external crisis.
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by the constituents.11
The model also assumes that the society prefers to take down the authoritarian regime
to pushing for a change of the officer, and both to keeping the status quo, given that
an external crisis takes place (3.2), but the cost of revolting against the regime is higher
than revolting against the officer in duty (3.3).
3.1.1 Society
Based on this specifications of the game, society would choose to revolt against the
office instead of the regime, and hence the incumbent herself, if and only if
[1−λ3] α2 − c2 ≥ 0
α2 ≥ c2
[1−λ3]
(3.4)
and
[1−λ3] α2 − c2 ≥ [1−λ3] α3 − c3
α2 − α3 ≥ c2 − c3
1−λ3
(3.5)
when the incumbent chose to allow for elections in t0, where α2 − α3 is the difference
between the utilities the society gets from revolting against the elected officer and the
regime itself, and c2 − c3 is the difference of the costs of these two alternatives which is
normalized by the probability of succeeding at undertaking the officer, 1−λ3 given that
the officer is elected.
Similarly, the society would choose to revolt against the office if and only if
[1−λ2] α2 − c2 ≥ 0
α2 ≥ c2
[1−λ2]
(3.6)
and
[1−λ2] α2 − c2 ≥ [1−λ2] α3 − c3
α2 − α3 ≥ c2 − c3
1−λ2
(3.7)
when the incumbent chose to designate an officer to the post in t0, where the only
11It is important to note that though a designated officer also allows for the blame shifting mechanism,
an elected officer is assumed to have a higher legitimacy in the eyes of the society, and therefore
i1 < i2 < i3. On the other hand, since the power loss is higher in case of an elected officer, the
consolidation of power decreases when elections are allowed, therefore the loss of power also increases,
k1 < k2 < k3.
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difference from the previous case is that the costs are normalized by the probability of
success against a designated officer, 1−λ2.
Finally, for the society would choose to revolt against the regime when the incumbent
decided to preserve the existing system as it is in t0 if and only if
[1−λ1] α3 − c3 ≥ 0
α3 ≥ c3
[1−λ1]
(3.8)
meaning that the cost of revolting against the regime should be lesser or equal to the
expected benefit of the action.
3.1.2 Incumbent - Election
Given these requirements for the mentioned preferences of the society are met, namely
choosing to revolt against the office instead of the regime when the incumbent decided
to assign an appointed officer or to allow the elections to be held for this purpose, and to
revolt against the regime if the incumbent decides to preserve the status quo in period
t0, the incumbent would prefer to implement the necessary institutions for an officer to
be elected with the incentive of creating a blame shifting if and when an external crisis
takes place knowing that the society will choose to revolt against the office if and only if
the following requirements are fulfilled.
Designated vs. Elected:
p β2 + (1−p) [λ2β2 + (1−λ2)σ2] ≤ p β3 + (1−p) [λ3β3 + (1−λ3)σ3]
(β2 − β3) ≤ (1−p)[λ3 (β3 −σ3) − λ2(β2 − σ2) − (σ3 − σ2)]
p
(3.9)
which means that the expected difference of utilities of the case where there is no crisis,
(β2 − β3), should be lesser or equal to the expected benefit of creating an office that
will be revolted against and be taken down with respective probabilities instead of a
possible revolt against the regime itself and risking the regime to be overthrown if a
crisis actualizes, [λ3 (β3 −σ3) − λ2(β2 − σ2)], minus the difference of the utility the
incumbent would get from getting away with an officer change instead of a possible
regime breakdown under the alternatives of a designated officer and an elected officer,
(σ3 − σ2).
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None vs. Elected:
p β1 + (1−p) (λ1 β1) ≤ p β3 + (1−p) [λ3 β3 + (1 − λ3) σ3]
λ3 β3 − λ1 β1 ≥ σ3 (1 − λ3) (p+1) − p [β3 (1 − λ3) − β1 (1 − λ1)]
λ3 β3 − λ1 β1 ≥ σ3 − σ3 λ3 + p σ3 (1 − λ3) − p [β3 (1 − λ3) − β1 (1 − λ1)]
(λ3 β3 − λ1 β1) ≥ σ3 (1 − λ3) − p [(1 − λ3) (β3 − σ3) − β1 (1 − λ1)] (3.10)
which means that the difference between the utilities that the incumbent would get
under an unsuccessful revolt for the cases in which the incumbent chose to allow for
elections to be hold and the incumbent preserved the status quo in period t0, (λ3 β3 −
λ1 β1), should be bigger or equal to the utility the incumbent would get from the
scenario in which the society successfully changes the elected officer, [σ3 (1 − λ3)],
minus the the difference between the extra utility loss if the society succeeds in revolting
against the regime instead of the office when elections are allowed, [(1 − λ3) (β3 − σ3)],
and the utility loss from a successful revolt against the regime when no institution is
implemented, [β1 (1 − λ1)], in period t0 for the incumbent if and when an external
crisis occurs.
3.1.3 Incumbent - Designated
Given the same requirements for the mentioned preferences of the society are met, the
incumbent would prefer to assign a designated officer instead of allowing an election of
one, if and only if the following criteria is met.
Designated vs. Elected:
p β2 + (1−p) [λ2β2 + (1−λ2)σ2] ≥ p β3 + (1−p) [λ3β3 + (1−λ3)σ3]
(β2 − β3) ≥ (1−p)[λ3 (β3 −σ3) − λ2(β2 − σ2) − (σ3 − σ2)]
p
(3.11)
which frankly gives us the cases in which the requirements explained for the first case
(3.9) under the criteria for the incumbent to choose to allow elections does not hold.
None vs. Designated:
p β1 + (1−p) (λ1 β1) ≤ p β2 + (1−p) [λ2 β2 + (1 − λ2) σ2]
(λ2 β2 − λ1 β1) ≥ σ2 (1 − λ2) − p [(β2 − σ2) (1 − λ2) − β1 (1 − λ1)] (3.12)
14
3.2 Theorems
Aybike Mutluer
M.A. Thesis
which means that for the incumbent to choose to create the necessary institutions to
assign an officer, considering that she will have a blame shifting mechanism in period
t3 if an external crisis takes place in period t2, the requirements specified in (3.10) for
the incumbent to have the incentive to allow for elections for the officer to be chosen by
the constituents have to hold this time with the regarding parameters of the alternative
designate.
3.2 Theorems
Theorem 1 If the inequalities specified in (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10)
holds, then the following strategies constitute a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium:
SI ( ² )= { Election }
SS ( h )=
O f f i ce when h = {Election, Designated}Reg i me when h = {None}
In this equilibrium, the incumbent chooses to allow for the elections to be hold for
the selection of the officer, knowing that the society will choose to revolt against the
office if and when an external crisis occurs. In other words, if the incumbent knows that
the blame shifting mechanism would work, given the possibility of a crisis taking place,
she prefers to share her power with the office through elections.
Theorem 2 If the inequalities specified in (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), (3.11) and (3.12)
holds, then the following strategies constitute a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium:
SI ( ² )= { Designated }
SS ( h )=
O f f i ce when h = {Election, Designated}Reg i me when h = {None}
In this equilibrium, the incumbent chooses to assign a designated officer, knowing
that the society will choose to revolt against the office if and when an external crisis
occurs. Therefore, similar to the equilibrium presented in Theorem 1, the incumbent,
aware of the society’s preferences due to perfect information assumption, have an in-
centive to create a blame-shifting mechanism, but since the inequality in (3.10) does
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not hold, she prefers to assign the officer instead of allowing for the constituents to elect
their candidate into the office.
Theorems 1 and 2 show us that given the necessary conditions, the incumbent of an
authoritarian regime has the incentive to create seemingly more democratic institu-
tions regardless of the other possible explanations provided by the previous research.
Moreover, the significant contrast between Theorem 1 and 2 provides the necessary
theoretical framework for further exploration of why some autocrats choose to assign
the officers whereas others hold authoritarian elections.
3.3 Comparative Statics
Due to the number of parameters required to model the strategic interaction between
the incumbent and the society in this context, visualizing the equilibria presented in
the previous chapter is not a trivial matter. Therefore, this section will present how the
incumbent’s preferences are effected by the change in some of the crucial parameters
to explain the dynamics of the model more clearly.
In Figure 4.1, the shadowed areas show the values of p for which the incumbent would
prefer to hold elections instead of preserving the status quo in which no such institution
exists.
Similarly, in Figure 4.2, the shadowed areas show the values of p for which the in-
cumbent would prefer to hold elections instead of creating an institution in which the
incumbent herself would designate an officer to create the blame shifting opportunity
in case of a future external crisis.
Both Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show us that as the probability of an external crisis increases,
the incentives of the incumbent to hold elections increases. This result is inline with
the argument presented in this paper, underlying that the blame shifting mechanism
can be used by incumbents who predicts things to go bad in the future even though it
means trading off a portion of their power in return.
Finally, in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, the shadowed areas show the values of λ2 and λ3,
respectively, for which the incumbent would prefer to hold elections instead of creating
an institution in which the incumbent herself would designate an officer.
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The incentives for the incumbent to hold elections decrease as the probability of
the society failing on their revolt against the regime when the incumbent creates the
institution in which she designates the officer increases in contrast to the case in which
the probability of failure against the regime when the incumbent allows for the election
of the officer. Both results are inline with the expectations of the argument since
keeping the other parameters constant, increasing the success rate of one alternative
implicitly increases the incentive of the agent to choose that alternative, and evident
from the equilibrium conditions, the incumbent chooses to hold elections if and only
if the payoffs from this alternative supersedes the cost of not choosing all the other
alternatives.
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Figure 3.3: Incumbent’s preferences for elections vs.none dependent on p
Figure 3.4: Incumbent’s preferences for elections vs.designated dependent on p
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Figure 3.5: Incumbent’s preferences for elections vs.designated dependent on λ2
Figure 3.6: Incumbent’s preferences for elections vs.designated dependent on λ3
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4 Case Studies
Chanting, the "people want the fall of the government" and calling for
the departure of Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, the activists marched
through the colonial-era streets of downtown Rabat in a light rain.12
On October 6th, Los Angeles Times among many other news sources published a piece
on the widespread demonstrations in Jordan. The article argued that the demonstrators,
led by the Muslim Brotherhood, demanded democratic reforms and asked for a more
representative legislature, yet "they pointedly did not demand the end of the monarchy,
which retains considerable support here."13 Similarly, Morocco, the next door neighbor
of the Arab Spring’s ground zero, managed to survive without encountering a major
revolt against its regime. Some argue that the reason for King Mohammed VI’s survival
was also due to his quick response in terms of reform, a new constitution, and his call
for early elections.14
Although regimes in Morocco and Jordan survived the turmoil of the Arab Spring
relatively unharmed, several countries across the MENA region were not as lucky as
they were. Starting with the self-immolation of Muhammed al-Bou’azizi in Tunisia
in December 2010, rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen have been forced from
power to date and the regime in Syria is still battling a fierce civil war against the public
opposition.
Consequently, facing this differentiation in the survival abilities of Arab states, the
key question becomes why some authoritarian countries have higher resilience when
tested with public uprisings whereas some countries do not? In other words, is there an
institutional mechanism that enables some countries to sail relatively smoothly through
the turmoil?
12By Paul Schemm, Associated Press, March 31, 2013
13http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-jordan-protest-20121006,0,281838.story
14http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/jul/05/how-morocco-dodged-arab-spring/
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To show that there exists such a mechanism, based on the results derived from the
formal model presented in the previous section, we will now turn to four cases of Arab
Spring, via which the existence as well as the real policy effectiveness of the blame
shifting mechanism will be demonstrated.
What should be kept in mind throughout these case studies is the fact that what
is attempted is not to follow the decision making processes that is presented in the
formal model in empirical cases. On the contrary, the aim of these case studies is
to demonstrate that blame-shifting do in fact help authoritarian regimes to survive.
Therefore, at least in the span of this M.A. thesis, I do not discuss the incentives of the
autocrats to create these institutions in the first place, I merely aim to show that, once
these institutions are created, they work.
4.1 Case Selection
The popular uprisings starting in late December 2010, namely the Arab Spring, in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region affected a large number of polities around
the globe directly or indirectly. But most of all, the uprisings showed us that a region
that have been thought to be condemned to autocracies for the foreseeable future15 are
also prone to change.
Nevertheless, the change we observed during and after the Arab Spring is homoge-
nous neither in nature nor in timing across the region. If anything, the occurrence of
the revolutions that we aggregately name as Arab Spring were similar to a tide that has
been felt differently in different shores depending on the structure of the shore itself.
What has started as a protest in the less-developed interior region of Tunisia, has also
presented itself as massive demonstrations in the capital of Egypt.16
Despite these disparities between cases, a pattern can also be recognized within the
whole picture. In other words, the very fact that some countries experienced a relatively
easier period in contrast to countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt that went through
a intense turmoil, present us with a puzzle of pattern. More specifically put, we need
to answer the questions why do some of the regimes in MENA region experienced a
less destructive process and is there a theoretical explanation behind this empirical
15Miller et al. (2012), p. 35
16Miller et al. (2012), p. 71
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observation?
Since, due to the unfortunate inability of social sciences to create experiments, we
cannot observe the same country with different values of a given parameter ceteris
paribus, we need to find the cases where the initial conditions are similar as much as
possible except our independent variable. For this purpose, the cases chosen, Tunisia,
Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, to demonstrate the equilibria under different parameters
are all non-oil exporters and all four of them are founded as independent countries after
an era of colonialism.
It is important for these countries to be non-rentier states, because natural resources,
and the wealth that they bring, under the command of the incumbent may alter the
incentives of both the societies and the autocrats of the countries.17 We can see an
example of such alteration in the attempt of Muammar Gaddafi to distribute a large
amount of money to each citizen in order to stop the protests. But more important then
this direct redistribution of wealth in times of crisis, there is also the possibility of such a
crisis never occurring in the first place due to some mechanism, like in the Saudi Arabia
and United Arab Emirates, other than the one explained in this thesis.
Secondly, colonialism with all its effects on the socio-cultural as well as economic
structure of the colonial state, it is important that all of the cases that are examined
here are founded around the same time and all experienced the change that has been
brought by Western colonialism. In that respect, it is true that not all cases were ruled
by the same colonial power, henceforth there maybe differences in the organizational
structures of their both economy and societies, but the limitations of the somewhat
quasi-experiment of Arab Spring dictates us to allow for such differentiation. Regardless,
the creation of the nation myth, the foundation of the state organization and probably
the incentives of the elites are shaped by this common experience and therefore the
history of colonization levels the points of origin for each of these modern states.
Another important factor for these countries to have a similar baseline is their eco-
nomic performance in the near past. Since the model is derived to see the affect of an
external crisis, hence most probably an internationally effective economic one, it is
important, if not crucial, for these countries to have a similar economic trend when
such a crisis struck their economy.
As it can be seen in Figure 3.1, the trends in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Jordan are
17Anderson (2011), p. 7
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Figure 4.1: GDP per capita of Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Jordan
quite similar up until the protests in 2010.18 Only after 2010, Egyptian and Tunisian
economies take a downturn relative to the economies of Morocco and Jordan. In this
regard, it can be said that, for the period prior to the Arab Spring, the economic perfor-
mances of the chosen countries are relatively similar, hence they were also paralleled in
this dimension, too.
In the rest of the paper, first the short history of the countries before the Arab Spring
will be presented with special attention on the evolution of their regimes throughout
time. Secondly, an analysis of the mentioned features of these regimes will be connected
with the conclusions derived from the model and an attempt at a possible explanation
for the diversity of outcomes will be derived.
4.1.1 Tunisia
"Had Ben Ali been intelligent, he would have today been a hero in Tunisia.
All he had to do was to win no more than 70 per cent of the vote."19
"I do not support him. I vote for him; that is different. The other day ...
one of my friends went to the bank to apply for a loan. He was asked for his
voting card; and you want us to have [political] choice." 20
Tunisia was not the most likely ground zero for public protests that will trigger a domino
effect through out the MENA region. It performed strongly on economic front, it had a
18http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx?isshared=trueispopular=seriespid=2
19Al-Ghannushi’s interview with the author, London, 20 November 1999.(Anderson (1999))
20(Anderson (1999), p.14)
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large middle class and it was not ruled by extremist ideologies - it was a secular rule. Yet,
through the events that started with the self-immolation of Mohammed al-Bou’azizi,
the 23 years rule of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ended in only 29 days. A rule
that has been constructed through patronage networks, internal security forces and a
regime that is window-dressed as a presidential democracy throughout the 50 years
since Tunisia’s independence could not even last a month.
Most of the literature that has been produced after the Arab Spring have focused on
how the protest started, where and why they started. Nevertheless, in relation to the
central hypothesis of this paper, here, it would be beneficial to examine the regime
before the Spring and how it evolved through the years that lead to the self-immolation
of Mohammed al-Bou’azizi.
Tunisia, since it’s independence, had only two presidents: Habib Bourguiba and Zine
El Abidine Ben Ali who took the power from Bourguiba with a bloodless coup in 1987.
Bourguiba, who has been seen as the founding father of the modern state of Tunisia was
replaced with Ben Ali who promised a better economic performance as well as a much
more liberal rule.21 Unfortunately, even though Tunisia performed well economically
despite of its lack of natural resources, the liberalization - or the democratization - of the
regime never happened. In fact, the ruling party in Tunisia, Constitutional Democratic
Rally - RCD, under the presidency of Ben Ali, shaped the electoral rules to enhance
the control of their rule. The most obvious of these alterations in the already not so
democratic regime in Tunisia was the removal of the term limits for the presidency and
the extension of the age limit for the office holders under Ben Ali.22 Examples include,
but not limited to, the Constitutional Law of 27 October 1997 by which the president
seized the ultimate power to rule by decree via Article 53, blurring the lines between the
domains of legislative and executive branches; the Constitutional Law of 1 June 2002 by
which the presidency for life is de facto re-established instead of total of three terms via
Article 39.
Ben Ali did not implemented policies that would enable him to be the president of
Tunisia for a longer period only, RCD also reformed the constitution to "institutional-
ize a controlled pluralism that could not challenge the survival of the authoritarian
regime."23 In addition to concentrating the ultimate authority in himself, Ben Ali also
made it impossible for the opposition to pose any real challenge even though there were
supposedly democratic elections in Tunisia.
21Miller et al. (2012), p. 60
22al Nour (2011)
23Gobe (2009)
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By the Paragraph 3 of the Article 40 of the Tunisian constitution, the presidential
candidates are required to obtain the sponsorship of 30 elected officers, a condition that
could not be fulfilled by no opposition candidate since the independence of the Tunisia,
since there existed a quota for the opposition and no opposition party ever managed to
win a city council, the municipal elections in 2000 can be given as an example in which
RCD won 195 out of 257 municipalities and shared the power in the remaining 62.24
Even before Ben Ali changed the constitution to lengthen his rule as the president in
2002, Nazih Ayubi argued that:
"Given Ben Ali’s rigid singularity, it is not out of place to speculate that
the trappings of power may tempt him not to give up high office as he is
supposed to in 2004."25
emphasizing how Ben Ali had already been seen as the only authority in Tunisia, a fea-
ture that he was not likely to let go to something short than a full-blown public uprising.
Figure 4.2: Tunisian Election Results, 1999 - 201026
All in all, especially with the creation of the Chambre des Deputes and even with the
increase in the number of seats allocated to the opposition from 7% to 19%, caused
the opposition to become a practical joke. Ben Ali winning 99% of the votes in the
24Anderson (1999), p.4
25Ayubi (1995)
26Miller et al. (2012), p. 67
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presidential elections in 1999 against the two opposition candidates, in addition to
the RCD’s absolute dominance in the legislative branch of the state, not to mention
the president’s already dictatorial powers even without the support of the legislature
created an excessively singular rule in which no one except Ben Ali could decide or at
least approve every single policy on every possible sphere of politics in Tunisia.
4.1.2 Egypt
"In Mubarak’s Egypt, the political system appeared to have all the devices
for a constitutional and democratic system. In practice, all lines of authority
ultimately led back to the president."27
Hosni Mubarak, the President of Egypt for the last 30 years, ousted from power after
only 18 days into the protests as the second Arab ruler forced to cede power after Ben
Ali of Tunisia.
Unlike Tunisia, representative institutions and civic organizations had been a part
of the Egyptian political life since the 1923 Constitution. Egypt was a constitutional
monarchy from 1923 to the Free Officers Revolution in 1952. During that period, even
though the king had the ultimate authority, the elected parliament as a decision-making
institution was one of the earliest in the region. Since the military coup in 1952, Egypt
had four presidents all of whom came from the officer corps. But especially from 1970s
onwards Anwar al-Sadat began to liberalize the system. He allowed the opposition to
have a presence in parliament and civil society as long as NDP - National Democratic
Party - held 2/3 majority, hence the real power. Even though, Mubarak followed the
same path in his initial years as the President, especially since 2006, his regime became
more and more restrictive on opposition presence in political sphere.28
In the parliamentary elections in 2010, out of the 518 seats total, 10 were directly ap-
pointed by the President, while 64 seats were reserved for women. Out of the remaining
444 ordinary seats that are contested nation-wide, NDP won 420, reaching a majority of
95%.30
Moreover, with his son, Gamal, being prepared for succeeding Mubarak31 and in his
last major round of governor appointments in 2008, 20/28 of the governors having mili-
tary, intern security or intelligence background, the illusion of democracy is fractured
27Brown and Shahin (2010)
28Shehata (2011)
29Presidential elections in 2005 are the first contested presidential regimes during Mubarak’s rule. Prior
elections were in fact referendum on parliament’s appointment.
30Shehata (2011)
31http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/10/AR2007101002436.html
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Year Election NDP
1987 Parliamentary 69.9 %
1987 Presidential 97.1%
1990 Parliamentary 76.7%
1993 Presidential 96.3%
1995 Parliamentary 70%
1999 Presidential 93.8%
2000 Parliamentary 77.8%
2005 Presidential 88.6%
2005 Parliamentary 69.5%
Figure 4.3: Egyptian Elections Results, 1987 - 200529
and the society started to view the whole system as a facade in which the opposition
parties as collaborators of the ruling party as they are somehow legitimizing the regime
by participating to these elections.
Therefore, in a nutshell, it can be said that, especially towards the end of the Mubarak’s
rule, once relatively liberal regime in Egypt has turned into a machine in which every
decision is made by or with the permission of the President and both the opposition
parties and the civil society organizations are incorporated into this system. What is also
crucial is the fact that society is also aware that both the executive and the legislative
branches of the state is absolutely controlled by the Mubarak and NDP32 , hence the
results are seen as nothing but an extension of the decisions made by the President and
his party.
4.1.3 Jordan
"Faithful to its irreversible choice to build a democratic State based on
the rule of law, the Kingdom of Morocco resolutely continues the process
of consolidating and reinforcing the institutions of a modern State, the
fundamentals of which are the principles of participation, pluralism and
good governance."33
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is founded as a British mandate after the World War
I, like many states in the region. Country has been handed over to the Hashemites in
32"Republics are nominal democracies, presidents will necessarily ’pretend that people have a voice’
by holding elections, whereas with monarchy no one’s pretending there’s a democracy." It can be
said that once a state is a democracy even if for the name’s sake, people start to have different
expectations from the regime, and they take some rights as given relative to monarchies, in which
every small step towards a more liberal regime is seen as an improvements instead of what had
to be there in the first place. (Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, NY Times, 24 February 2011 -
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/middleeast/25diplomacy.html?pagewanted=all)
33The beginning of the introductory part of the new constitution of Morocco. (Benchemsi (2012), p.60)
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1920s. Although the Transjordan area is multi-ethnic region, citizens of the modern
Jordan state generally call themselves as Jordanian.34
Monarchy in Jordan has only been challenged twice; during mid-50s, Nasserist revo-
lution and during early-70s, Black September, a Palestinian fedayeen backed by Syrian
invasion.35 Since early-70s, the state is governed mainly by original Jordanians, while
the economy is dominated by the Palestinians, whom total up to half or more of the
population. Hence, Jordanians, depending more on the state support, suffered more
when the Jordan state had to decrease its support on citizens. In this regard, the protests
that are connected to the Arab Spring mainly concentrated on the neoliberal economic
policies implemented by the government.36
King Abdullah II, as a response to the protests, first approved an aid package to rem-
edy the effects of the policies that are contested by the public. But, the public discontent
could not be settled by an aid package, therefore, on February 1st, the King replaced the
Prime Minister Rifa’i with Marouf Bakhit, who is well known by the society as a former
major general and ambassador to Israel. Moreover, King Abdullah II reformed the the
constitution which stated that the parliament to be elected via open contestation and it
can override the King’s veto with a 2/3 majority - though the King still has the executive
authority and appoint the cabinet - to allow for more transparent and fair elections.37
4.1.4 Morocco
In Morocco, the ruling family has been recruited and installed to power by the colonial
rule.38 The Alovite dynasty was present in Morocco region since 1666, providing the
Moroccan kings a similar legitimacy with the Saudi Arabia royalty. Due to this historic
connection of the royal family to the land, it can be argued that for the majority of the
population Morocco can not be imagined without its royal family.39
When the protests started in other countries in MENA region, King Mohammed IV
of Morocco chose to implement constitutional reforms to settle any possible uprisings
34Keyman (2011)
35"In parliamentary elections in 1989, the opposition won more than half of the seats in parlia-
ment. As a response, the King changed the law to one-man, one-vote system with newly formed
electoral districts that benefit the monarchy royalists." In this regard, we can argue that pub-
lic expressed their discontent for monarchy loyalist governments before but in the absence of
an external crisis, the King was strong enough to suppress this discontent for almost 15 years. -
(http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/13/the_implications_of_jordans_new_electoral_law)
36Susser (2011)
37Miller et al. (2012)
38Lucas (2004), p.106
39Keyman (2011)
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in his country. In June 2011, he announced constitutional reforms that would transfer
some of the executive authority that by then resided in the monarch to the Prime Minis-
ter, whom from then on will be selected from the majority party in the parliament. In
July 2011, one month after the announcement, reforms were put to referendum and
accepted with majority.
Although these reforms seemingly helped to achieve the goal of settling any possible
major uprisings, we should not make the mistake to think that Mohammed IV actually
transferred his powers to the elected officers. Instead, the King of Morocco still has
the power to control the military, security and religious spheres. Moreover, he can still
create laws or block the ones that has been passed from the parliament by the royal
decree.40
"As long as the King gives parties a minimum consultive role in the present
formation of policy and as long as he is able to keep alive their future hopes
of governing, their interests as pressure groups are better served by playing
the game than by changing the system."41
All in all, it can be said that with their position relatively secured via their role as the
foundation of the modern state in the public opinion as well as their religious/divine
claims42, it was easier for the Kings of Jordan and Morocco to at least look like they
agreed to share their authority with other institutions inside the regime mechanism,
and they seem to sail rather smoothly, relative to the Presidents of Egypt and Tunisia,
through the Arab Spring, perhaps, thanks to this flexibility of their regime.
4.2 Analysis on Regime Survival
"The survival of monarchical regimes is contingent on their institutional
flexibility in attentive management of the regime’s coalition of supporters
and society at large."43
"Kings are less frightened than presidents to open political liberalization
in the Middle East because the mobilization ... can be accommodated under
the existing political system with minimal discontinuities."44
40Benchemsi (2012), pp. 58-62
41Zartman (1967), p.582
42"Both the royal families of Jordan and Morocco claim to be descendants of the Prophet Mohammed."
(Keyman (2011))
43Lucas (2004), p.117
44Lucas (2004), p. 113
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Personalist regimes evolved slowly from single party governments in Tunisia and Egypt,
which allows us to articulate that the personalistic leaders of both countries gained
more power and control over all executive, legislative and judicial aspects of the state
throughout time. During this process, it is important to note that the leaders of these
single parties, running a tight ship both against the rivalries within the party and the
potential opponents that may rise to challenge the ruling party, may have been facing
a higher cost for dividing their power with another executive body than the kings of
Morocco or Jordan.
In this regard, one way of looking at the process of non-liberalization for Egypt and
Tunisia45 is the necessity of being ever more powerful and in control of the state organi-
zation on the Mubarak’s and Ben Ali’s parts. Absence of a relatively legitimate ground
for a dictatorship, unlike the myth of divine authority bestowed upon the Mohammed
of Morocco and Abdullah II of Jordan, must have it’s effect on the strategic calculations
of these two autocrats.
More specifically, in the language of the model presented in the previous chapter,
β1, or the utility of retaining the whole power of the dictatorship in himself may out
weight the expected value of creating an institution that can be used to shift the blame
in case of a crisis by sharing the power the incumbent has. Therefore, it can be said that
the circumstances that has been realized by the structural features of these one-party
regimes violated the necessary and sufficient conditions that are required for the game
to reach the equilibria derived in the previous chapter.
It is important to emphasize that these countries, Tunisia and Egypt, according to the
assumptions made in the model, did not experienced a regime breakdown not because
the autocrats in those countries did not know that they have an option to create such a
mechanism and use it once the protests started. On the contrary, the incumbents of the
regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, unlike the kings of Morocco and Jordan, did not preferred
to create those institutions given the ratio of the expected utilities of each possible action
and the probability of a crisis taking place.
45Tunisia and Egypt are classified as sultanistic regimes in some of the previous literature, in the context
that a sultanistic regime arise "when a national leader expands his personal power at the expense of
formal institutions." (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67694/jack-a-goldstone/understanding-
the-revolutions-of-2011)
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"The cautious, muted nature of the protests and movements in the MENA
monarchies is telling. In Jordan, protestors have called for some reforms,
but not the overthrow of King Abdullah’s regime. In Morocco, discontent
has been channeled into a political movement based on "transformation
without violence" and a new constitution, approved by a public referendum,
which may augur greater liberalization."46
On the other hand, the kings of Morocco and Jordan, again in the language of the
model presented, faced different values for these parameters. The placement of the
king in the structure of the state organization allowed these autocrats to appear more
impartial relative to the personalistic incumbents in Egypt and Tunisia. Whereas Ben Ali
and Mubarak had to face, and moreover silence, the dissidence caused by their hold on
power, King Mohammed and King Abdullah II could allow the mentioned institutions
to be established without neither loss of face nor real power.47
Their position in the state structure as a higher authority, in contrast to incumbents’
struggle with daily politics in Egypt and Tunisia, provided them the luxury to implement
policies that would allow them to utilize the blame shifting mechanism in times of crisis
by decreasing the gap between the utility of being in power alone and sharing the power
with an officer that is either designated or elected as a part of the executive branch of
the state.
The important distinction, then, is the affect of the position of the incumbent relative
to the overall internal political system of a given country and the degree that the incum-
bent is flexible to share, or appear to be sharing, a portion of her power. In that respect,
it can be argued that the kings in Morocco and Jordan were able to allow for such an
institution to be created because it was feasible for them to choose these actions, con-
sidering the response of the society and the probability of an external crisis, whereas for
the incumbents in Egypt and Tunisia, the power relations in their own political systems
deterred them from resorting to this mechanism in the first place by altering the payoffs
of equilibrium paths relative to the ones faced by the Morocco and Jordan’s kings.
46Menaldo (2012), p. 708
47"...whereas monarchies tend to be ’part of their country’s DNA.’" (Alan Greenblatt, NPR) -
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/10/142218146/in-arab-states-its-good-to-be-the-king
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5 Conclusion
The self-immolation of Mohammed al-Bou’azizi set events into motion that affected
millions of people, directly in MENA region and indirectly in other parts of the world.
What is important in all this turmoil, for this paper’s purpose, is the fact that the regime
type that believed to be permanent in that region showed a major weakness in the face
of public dissent.
One problem with scholarly work on authoritarian institutions is, as a scholar who
normatively believe in the merits of democracy, the threat of producing a guideline
for autocratic survival. As Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) also argued, this paper is not
written to guide autocratic leaders to make their rule more resilient. On the contrary, I
strongly believe political science literature should focus more on authoritarian tactics
for survival to understand what makes these regimes persist not only in the Middle East
and North Africa region but also in the rest of the world.
It is important to note that the model presented here does not claim to be the ultimate
theory on regime survival, instead it creates an analytical framework via the formal
model to better understand a mechanism that may be seen quite intuitive to some
social scientist. To explain the mechanism that is depicted in the model more clearly,
and therefore draw a better picture, four cases has been chosen.
The main point, that is supported via these four cases, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and
Morocco, is that an authoritarian regime can survive public discontent even if it’s a
movement strong enough to affect multiple countries through a short span of time, if
the regime has the institutions that are required to shift the blame of the conditions that
led to the uprisings to another officer, in my cases a prime minister.
The model shows us that there exists conditions that provide the necessary incentives
to the incumbent (authoritarian ruler) to implement such a mechanism as well as the
society to uprise against that institution instead of the regime itself, therefore to validate
the choice made by the incumbent.
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Empirically, in this paper we have shown that whereas in Egypt and Tunisia, the
incumbents, due to the conditions that affected their incentives chose not to utilize this
strategy, whereas in Morocco and Jordan, the kings were faced with different values for
the parameters, hence they ended up in a more beneficial equilibrium for their regime.
My explanation for this differentiation in end-game results is the difference in the ratio
of parameters for the utility the incumbent get when they keep the power intact and be
the only authority and for the utility they get when they share the power, either through
designation or election.
As it is argued in section 4.2, this difference does not result from the incumbents’
inability to see the alternatives. On the contrary, by assumption, each authoritarian
leader knows such a possibility exists. The fact that leads to some incumbents to not be
able to utilize this mechanism is the fact that they are better off, given the probability
of the crisis, the utility they lose if they get overthrown, the utility they get if they share
the power and the utility if they remain the sole authority, by not initializing such a
mechanism due to the innate structure of their regimes.
One point for the political science scholars may be further inquiry on these innate
structures. If we can understand how these features that lead to more resilient authoritar-
ian regimes through this mechanism are sustained, we can have a better understanding
of the factors that still allow for autocracies to exists in today’s world.
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